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Abstract
This article investigates the nature of historical consciousness – conceptualizations and 
constructions of the past outside academic history – and the way in which this has changed in 
parallel with developments in historical theory in recent decades. With the increased constructivist 
questioning of historical narratives as somehow objectively true, academic history is seen to have 
lost some of its authority regarding the past. It is argued that, in becoming more aware of its 
nature as interpretation as well as more sensitive to its motives and consequences, history now 
has the potential to become more pragmatic and presentist. At the same time, some theoretical 
discussions have turned to the less strictly historical questions of memory and presence, thus 
evading the call to responsibility. By examining historical consciousness in relation to these 
debates, the article suggests that, in line with the liberation of the past from the constraints of 
academic history, historical consciousness no longer needs to be as focused on the interpretations 
and knowledge provided by the institution of history but can be increasingly determined by popular 
understandings and the needs of consumers.
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In what follows, I approach the question of the relationship between 
historical research and the use of the past by examining the idea of historical 
consciousness. Although historical consciousness offers a natural point of entry 
into this broader debate concerning the ways in which we relate to the past, it 
is a problematic concept at the outset because it ties our temporal structurings 
and orientation in the world to history – that is, to institutional interpretations of 
the past. Views about the nature of history have changed significantly in recent 
decades, yet these changes have so far been largely ignored in the discussion 
of historical consciousness.
The problem of historical consciousness
A more detailed analysis of the meaning of historical consciousness is needed 
because the concept is so often used to point to broader thinking about the past 
that runs alongside academic historical research and writing – it is comparable 
to concepts like “the practical past” (OAKESHOTT 1985) as well as “cultural” 
and “collective memory” (see, for example, HUYSSEN 2003; ASSMANN 2006). 
In addition to the fact that historical consciousness is misleading as a concept 
(if not indeed a complete misnomer), understandings regarding the significance 
of this kind of consciousness need to be rethought to better accommodate 
contemporary views of what history is.
The most obvious challenge comes from the general loss of authority of 
historical knowledge, or – thought of in another way – from the increased use 
and popularity of history and historical knowledge independently of practicing 
historians. It can be argued that, as an institution, history and historical 
interpretations no longer appear as incontestable to the wider audience as in 
the past, or, at least, that the representations historians present are not seen as 
scientific to the same extent as before. Because the truthfulness and authority 
of historical representations has been brought into question in this way, the 
broader public now has more opportunities for using the past in ways that are 
meaningful to them. In this sense, the past no longer belongs exclusively to 
historians even in terms of knowledge about it. Hence historical consciousness 
can no longer be controlled by historical research (if it ever could).
Questioning the scientific nature of historical research and the truth status of 
the stories historians produce does not mean that factual information about the past 
could not be gathered through historical research methods. Extreme simplifications 
and polemic arguments of this sort appear to be based on an inability to distinguish 
between historical research and historical writing. Although a clear demarcation of 
these “phases” in historians’ practice is impossible, distinguishing between them – 
between research and writing – is imperative in theoretical discussions if we desire 
to gain a better grip on the phenomenon of history.
The heuristic separation of the writing or representing phase – the 
construction of historical stories – from the study of the facts of the past and 
the particular skills and methodologies involved in that study even on the level 
of common conceptions of history well reflects the popularization of historical 
consciousness. Even though the image of the past which history produces, as 
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well as the facts that it brings to our knowledge, still (to some extent) direct 
our views of the past and its impact on our present, our personal, significance-
laden past is increasingly openly constructed on the basis of present-day needs 
and demands. In addition, because this is primarily a question of selection of 
perspective, this personal past in no way clashes or competes with institutional 
history writing – or no more, at least, than different historical points of view 
and research emphases within the institution do with each other. It has, in other 
words, become quite accepted that the same phenomenon (and hence largely 
the same set of facts) can be examined from completely differing perspectives 
and in diverse contexts.
This same change in attitudes – the acceptance of irony, to employ Hayden 
White’s terminology – is also borne witness to by the expansion of the range 
of institutionally recognized historical approaches. Where history in the 1950s 
mostly still consisted of a methodologically closely regulated and source-critical 
study of events and great men, this kind of history constitutes only a narrow slice of 
contemporary approaches. Alongside this “traditional” history, and at times even 
supplanting it, we now have a variety of approaches offering “alternative” points 
of view. Of these, particularly central have become microhistory and “everyday 
history” (Alltagsgeschichte), social history, women’s history and cultural history, 
as well as a number of even more politically focused approaches (for instance 
feminist, postcolonial and queer histories), each of which has its own theoretical 
canon. Despite the reforms that these approaches have facilitated, they too are 
committed to the habitual understanding of historical knowing and the ideals 
of truth implied by historical research. Even they do not focus on historical 
consciousness in a broader sense – on perceptions of the past and the meanings 
they can have for us – but primarily on history, on institutionally approved 
stories about the past as well as the factual information relating to them.
History and historical writing cannot, then, usefully be taken as synonymous 
with historical consciousness. And the same applies to historical knowledge.
Historical consciousness as practical and popular knowing
Although historical consciousness is thus in many ways based on history 
and historical writing, albeit through many stages and processes, it is also 
influenced by more current social discourses, popular culture, oral traditions, 
and so forth. Thus historical consciousness is strongly shaped both by the needs 
and priorities of the present – which direct attention to specific aspects of the 
past – and by the traces of the past, both physical and ideological.1
Any categorizing and categorical definition of historical consciousness would 
probably prove impossible and is, in any event, pointless from the perspective 
of the present article.2 It is perhaps enough to note, then, that the question of 
1 Any such presence of the past can best (and without needless mystifications) be explained in terms of a 
“practical past”, independent of historical studies (see OAKESHOTT 1985). This concept has recently been 
revived by Hayden White (see e.g. WHITE 2012).
2 In his Metahistory (1973), Hayden White has famously used the concept of historical consciousness in 
charting views about history held by various nineteenth-century historians. However, Metahistory has been 
criticized for some time now, even in White’s own assessments of it, for its restrictive and formalistic theoretical 
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the nature of historical consciousness is complex, and the answer – the reading 
– depends almost entirely on the selected perspective. On the other hand, even 
though historical consciousness (or at least consciousness of history) can vary 
greatly between individuals, ranging from complete ignorance and disinterest 
to obsessive contextualization and historicizing of all activities, it is certainly a 
substantial heuristic tool on the group or societal level (see e.g. DAVIES 2006). 
Hence, an important issue relating to historical consciousness is its relation to the 
use of the past and, by way of this, also to the social role of historical studies.
As a result of its shared and partly institutional nature, historical 
consciousness is also to some extent normative. In this sense too, no 
understanding of the past is – indeed cannot be – purely epistemological but, 
instead, each one always also reproduces and reconstitutes earlier values 
and ways of thinking. The same dynamics of repetition is unavoidable, of 
course, in all linguistic activity since we always employ agreed-upon or 
“given” meanings. From this necessary structural inertia also follows that 
perceptions of the past and any general historical consciousness do not change 
in any obvious relation to the new factual knowledge and “discoveries” that 
historical research produces. The fact that historical consciousness is in this 
way independent of and detached from the study of the past in terms of 
knowledge also underscores the parallel independence of its function from 
that of research and from the institution of history. Historical consciousness 
– if such an entity can be located – is thus not in any way obliged to follow 
interests that research could somehow dictate. That is to say: the relationship 
between these phenomena is quite permissive.
The relative independence of historical consciousness (and, in fact, also of 
historiography) as well as the associated emphasis on functionality and prevailing 
needs is rarely present in discussions of historical research. Perhaps to an extent 
precisely because of the lack of attention given to these, historians have in recent 
decades felt justified in blaming the relativism associated with postmodernism for 
the fragmentation and pluralization of historical consciousness and historicities. 
Such accusations completely ignore the broad range and nature of conceptions 
relating to the past, however, and instead assume that historical research holds 
a privileged position in society.
However, this kind of freeing of the past is not only a theoretical phenomenon, 
but also part of a change that has a wider social reach (see e.g. HUYSSEN 2003; 
COHEN 2005; cf. also AGNEW 2004; 2007; MUNSLOW 2010). Indeed, the fact that 
the past has more non-controlled and popular applications than those belonging 
to the institution of history is striking; especially so when we stop to consider the 
everydayness and relentless presence of talk about the past, a phenomenon not 
framework. In recent decades, the most influential contribution to discussions of historical consciousness is 
to be found in the work of Jörn Rüsen. For him, historical consciousness is first and foremost a process 
of signification, which facilitates an orientation toward the future. Like so many others, he too notes the 
connection between historical consciousness and the narrative structuring of experiences (RÜSEN 2005, 24–
26). Rüsen’s intentions appear to be largely taxonomic, however; he defines a range of categories of historical 
consciousness, depending on particular uses. In parallel discussions, John Lukacs (1994, 12–14) has linked 
historical consciousness to self-understanding and Jorma Kalela (2000) has attempted to reconcile the ideals 
of more conventional historical studies with the inevitability of social uses of history.
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unrelated to the (almost always) unavoidable need for thinking “historically”. The 
consumption of the past in so many diverse ways is not – even in this “history” 
context – dependent on any scientific commitments to truth.
Changing theory of history: the linguistic turn and ideals of objectivity
Even though postmodern theorizing cannot be blamed for the 
instrumentalization and commodification of the past, the views it brings to the 
table are an integral part of this broader social change. In this sense, the debate 
within the theory of history and any consequent changes in attitudes help explain 
shifts in the status of historical research and in the contents of more general 
beliefs about history.
In the context of historical studies, postmodernism commonly refers to 
the linguistic turn and to the constructivist theorizing associated with it. The 
key figures in this contemporary form of constructivism include Hayden White, 
Frank Ankersmit, Keith Jenkins and Alun Munslow.3 The focus of these thinkers 
on the narrative nature of historical writing, as well as on the construction of 
meaning that takes place in narration, has led many historians to the extreme 
and erroneous conclusion that this narrative constructivism implies the equal 
fictionality or inventedness of history and literature. In other words, narrative 
constructivist theory is too often understood to argue that history is imaginary 
in the same way as fiction. Yet, approached more moderately – and more to 
the point – it should be clear that what is at stake is that the story constructed 
around historical facts is fictive because it does not and cannot as such (that 
is, as a story) have a counterpart in reality. What is important to understand, 
then, is that narrative constructivism is not premised on any anti-realism or even 
anti-referentialism – positions that would imply that reality did not exist or that 
history and historical writing could not somehow refer to it – and that it thus does 
not constitute a denial of historical study. Historical research retains its role of 
investigating the facts of the past, then, even after it becomes detached from the 
narrative construction of meaning (see esp. JENKINS 1999; MUNSLOW 2010).
Despite the self-evidence of the constructed nature of narratives, this kind 
of thinking has met with a great deal of resistance. Most objections appear to 
be based on insufficient reading or careless interpretations, however. When this 
so-called postmodern relativism is understood in its precise sense – as saying 
that meanings are not “out there” in the world but are constructed by readings 
– it does not seem to challenge commonsense intuitions or to significantly 
contradict our everyday negotiations of the world. Regardless, historians often 
experience it as contrary to the scientific aspirations of historical studies, 
at least with respect to the more traditional emphasis on methodology and 
objectivity. Yet we might optimistically think that some degree of relativism 
is a given for more recent trends in historical research; and, further, that the 
opposition to constructivism by proponents of these trends is based on the 
3 Their constructivism can be distinguished from earlier forms (constructivism à la Giambattista Vico, R. G. 
Collingwood or Michael Oakeshott, for example) by greater attention to narrativity – hence the designation 
“narrative constructivism”.
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common misconception that constructivism also necessitates a disavowal of 
singular facts and the referentiality of historical representations.4
It may be that for a wider audience accepting these changes in theoretical 
thinking as well as in the various ways of approaching the past even within the 
institution of history is something much more straightforward. Claims concerning 
the scientific nature of history writing, for them, may indeed sound strange to 
begin with. For this public, stories are simply stories, and it has become quite 
comfortable – both through entertainment media and through serious news 
coverage, not least in the sphere of political opinion and political debates, I 
would say – with the idea that content can be, and often has to be, distinguished 
from opinions and interpretation. Contemporary reading sensibilities are often 
already ironic and have no room for the kind of objectivity that is still idealized 
in conservative views of history.5
History as an engine of change?
There exists an interesting paradox relating to the popular use of history 
and challenges to the authority of historical research: while conceptions about 
the past have been liberated from myths of straightforward interpretations and 
objectivity, expectations regarding the past and its significance have increased, 
or at least diversified. As consumers are now able to freely choose their own 
preferences, subjective positions and group affiliations, there is a different 
demand for evidence about the past and its impact. And while the subjectivity 
and ironic quality of such evidence and valuations is to some extent recognized, 
historical arguments still have a high status in many contexts.6 Hence, although 
the interpretation of the past is understood as being rhetorical on one level, 
this rhetoric continues to play a central role in the ways in which we position 
ourselves in the present.
Rhetoric based on views of the past is abundant, then,7 and it is often 
expedient to forget its heuristic nature when involved in the exercise of power. 
Of course, for this very reason, the ideological commitments of history and 
its important role in the strengthening of existing structures and institutions 
have been one focus of postmodern and poststructuralist theories. Consciously 
attaching this ironic awareness to broader interpretations and uses of history 
and the past – to historical consciousness – is of utmost importance.
4 Many practitioners may experience talk of “traditional” or “objective” history as merely exaggerated or 
outdated rhetoric. When the constructivist aspect of history writing is emphasized, though, such rather 
extreme positions easily surface in reactions to it. Even in the theoretical debates about history there still 
exist views that seek to question the significance of the narrative dimension. The most blatant examples of 
these (and the ones that narrative constructivists have addressed in detail) can be found in e.g. IGGERS 2000 
and ZAGORIN 1999. See also Ankersmit’s detailed response to similar allegations on an earlier occasion, in 
ANKERSMIT 1990.
5 On irony in White’s thinking, see e.g. PAUL 2006. On irony and audience sensibilities, see PIHLAINEN 2008.
6 As Christoph Classen and Wulf Kansteiner remind in their introduction to a very inspiring Theme Issue of 
History and Theory: “Most history products, be they novels, photographic exhibits, or docudramas, strive for a 
certain degree of factual accuracy; in this respect they take their cues from professional historiography. But the 
same products derive historical legitimacy, as well as entertainment value, primarily from a careful adaptation 
to and manipulation of contemporary media aesthetics. The real block-busters à la Vonnegut, Spielberg, and 
Friedländer appear to take considerable risks by committing well-gauged, yet radical, transgressions of the 
conventional limits of historical taste” (CLASSEN; KANSTEINER 2009, p. 3).
7 Martin Davies (2006) describes the pervasiveness of historical thinking with the apt term “historics”.
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One possible way of emphasizing the practical and subjective nature of 
interpretations – while simultaneously leaving room for ideas about the past and 
its significance (and thus better engaging with the aforementioned paradox) – is 
to further underscore the formation of those ideas here and now as well as their 
specific and often intentional targeting of the present. As attention shifts to the 
purpose of particular interpretations, the question of the responsibilities involved 
in writing or representation also becomes better defined: historical research can 
be seen as having previously disregarded the question of its responsibilities 
by virtue of distorted views of objectivity – because what was said was simply 
“true”. Thus the question of the consequences of representing was not relevant. 
Now, however, the issue of responsibility is increasingly determined on the basis 
of conceivable consequences: if the representation promises to serve the goals 
intended by the author, he or she has already actively assumed responsibility for 
the writing. While this may at first seem to provide cause for concern (which is 
why it has so often met with objections), there is no radical difference to earlier 
practice. In relation to historical consciousness, the idea of consequentialist 
or pragmatist interpretations is more natural: where particular facts do not 
entail specific stories or interpretations in historical writing, neither do the 
chosen stories or interpretations later entail specific attitudes and action when 
transferred to the level of historical consciousness. In other words, the ends to 
which interpretations are used, what is done after they have been presented, 
remains open and negotiable.
It can be argued that the practical and contractual nature of historical writing 
as negotiation is already evident in contemporary historical consciousness and 
the aware (if not necessarily ironic) uses we make of the past. If historical study 
has indeed lost its former authority over truth in the popular consciousness, then 
the evaluation of interpretations will have shifted increasingly toward pragmatic 
and aesthetic considerations there too. Since historical studies can no longer 
define and circumscribe acceptable interpretations or legislate the consequences 
of these, opportunities for social action and impact are now increasingly to be 
found in practical meanings and the form that representations take.
The consequences of readings and interpretations of the past, on the other 
hand, are determined on clearly pragmatic, extra-historical grounds. Because 
these consequences also come to be actualized – at least to a great extent 
– in the ways in which they shape the general historical consciousness and 
prevailing opinion, they cannot be assumed to be easily manageable from an 
institutional vantage point in the current intellectual climate. This is of course to 
be embraced, at least as long as we remember that contractual valuations and 
action – ethics and politics – are distinct from or independent of the knowledge 
produced by history. Again: there is no entailment from facts to values.
Presentational form and vested interests
Conventional history writing is sometimes claimed to uphold prevailing 
modes of thought and the hegemony of history simply by its employment of 
realistic representational forms. This is so, the argument goes, already simply 
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because the illusion of unproblematic truth or congruent perspectives produced 
by realistic narration feeds into the idea of the existence of an objective history 
(or, once again, of an entailment from facts to values). As a result of the 
opportunities that realistic writing affords “objective” historying in covering up 
these representational problems, many of the representatives of constructivism 
– with Hayden White at the fore – have called for the adoption of alternative 
forms. Such forms would break specifically with that of the nineteenth-century 
realist novel, still most often taken to constitute the archetype for conventional 
history writing in these discussions.
White in particular has actively sought these alternatives from modernist 
literature and experimental art (WHITE 1978; 1999). This is more than 
understandable, since modernism in this literary sense focuses expressly on 
challenging the existence of unequivocal truth and on emphasizing the importance 
of subjective perspective. The possibilities of alternative presentational forms 
have, however, still received scarce attention within historical writing (for more 
on these, see e.g. PIHLAINEN 2002; 2009).
Partly from this same desire to subvert the realistic form of writing, a 
number of historians and theorists – White included – have turned to film as a 
potential source of inspiration for historical representations (WHITE 1999; see 
also e.g. MUNSLOW; ROSENSTONE 2004; HUGHES-WARRINGTON 2007). This 
option seems at times to involve, however, a conception of film as somehow a 
superior medium (and on occasions even an unproblematic one) in and of itself, 
and consequently the need for alternative narrative form is forgotten. When 
film is defended as a means of representation on the basis of its immediacy, 
its visuality, or its effectiveness in producing heightened experientiality, for 
example, the question of its form and the assumptions and values related to 
that form are often ignored.
In many discussions, comparisons between means of representation seem 
to me too easily to return to questions of content and facts, and the determining 
ideal of realistic form goes unchallenged. Even when attention is given to impact, 
focus is often on the experiential effect produced or on the power and credibility 
of the performance. In neither case is the problem of the possibilities of historical 
knowledge fully addressed on the level of the form or that of narration. Even though 
the discussion of the effectiveness of a representation already introduces a move 
away from the fact–fiction debate in the epistemic sense, at stake are still – at least 
in the case of popular, entertainment-oriented presentations – accustomed forms 
of narration; the limits and possibilities of representation are seldom investigated. 
In addition to film, this difficulty can be witnessed in the relatively conservative 
forms adopted even by many so-called alternative histories.
With respect to any general historical consciousness, the case is essentially 
identical. Historical writing, as well as the use of history and portrayals of the 
past in classrooms, films, historical novels, history villages, reconstructions, 
reenactments, and so on, still appear to be conceived of quite unproblematically 
– at least consumers are not actively reminded of the perspectival nature of 
representing the past (see e.g. AGNEW 2004). It might well be asked: why 
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would it be a problem in the kind of already ironic and multiskeptical reception 
climate that I have described if there were no explicit connection (for consumers 
and for the institution of history alike) between representations and uses of the 
past and the idea of ambiguities, alternative readings and parallel perspectives? 
In practice this may well not constitute a problem. Consumers are increasingly 
skeptical and pragmatic and are not burdened by the same commitment to 
truthfulness as the historian. From the point of view of a theoretical discussion, as 
well as in considerations of mechanisms of power and control it might, however, 
be viewed as problematic that – despite the opportunities they offer – these 
more experimental forms of historical thinking also fail to foster skepticism.
Historical consciousness and the freeing of the past
The association of historical consciousness with conventional interpretive 
strategies and the availability of truth can, potentially, foster prejudice and 
narrow-mindedness. Transferred to practice, firm beliefs concerning the “true” 
state of things serve to complicate communication and exacerbate difficulties 
stemming from differences of opinion. Conversely, recognition of the unavailability 
of a meaning to the past may facilitate a more tolerant and open attitude both 
toward other people and toward their interpretations of the past and its impact 
on, for example, problems in their present. So, here too, historical research 
and facts have very little power: conflicts result from differences of opinion 
concerning meaning(s).
Historical consciousness is a misleading term precisely because it ties views 
about the past to history, to the institutional study and interpretation of the past. 
Although this conceptual difference is not obvious in everyday usage, and the 
role of historical research and writing as a component of historical consciousness 
is thus not explicitly determined, the terminology of the historical attaches us 
to a tradition of thinking in which historians have a somehow privileged take on 
and “access” to the past. Because history as an institution has the additional 
advantage of its hegemonic position and strong bonds with existing formations 
of power – history is still most often the interpretation of the past by those in 
power and it strengthens and reproduces conservative values –, harnessing 
it as an engine of historical consciousness produces conventional views that 
participate in obscuring and questioning marginal perspectives (again, it should 
be noted that this is not a statement about factual information, but about 
interpretations concerning the meaning of the past).
One might, of course, assume that such alternative approaches in 
historical studies, for instance microhistory or women’s history, would provide 
the opportunity to counter the problems of a hegemonic history. Indeed, these 
once-radical positions have permitted some challenging of power structures 
within the institution of history. Today, however, they are largely part of that 
existing institutional structure. More importantly, because they have mainly 
been focused on new materials and subject points of view, they have not really 
deviated from the theoretical commitments of more conventional historical 
writing but have instead actively marginalized themselves with respect to 
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the dominant interests in historical studies. To say it differently: since such 
approaches are usually interested in showing how existing research has neglected 
some aspect of reality, they too fail to inspire deeper investigation into the 
nature of historical writing and representation. Within the institution even these 
alternative approaches focus, then, on the search for a commensurable truth. 
Representational responsibility is thus not to the present but there is, instead, 
still a belief that it might somehow be possible (not to mention requisite) to “do 
justice” to the past. And as long as historical consciousness is thought of in this 
same fashion, it is hard to relate it to contemporary needs.
Distinguishing between memory, history and general views about the past 
is thus of paramount importance. When we realize that there is no direct or non-
problematic connection between history (institutional or institutionally sanctioned 
knowledge about the past) and discourses of memory or popular conceptions 
about the past (which undergo continuous change as a result of the varying 
contents, situations and demands of the present), historical consciousness is 
released from the requirements of veridicality ascribed to historical interpretation 
and narration. We can continue to hold pragmatically “correct” views about the 
ways and quality of life of people in the past, for example. But, on the level of 
such general historical consciousness, we will also understand that our views 
about the meaning of these conditions for those people do not constitute history 
or even contribute to the kind of knowledge that we can justifiably call historical.
The pragmatic nature of views concerning the past
Applied to historical writing, the dominant trend of constructivist 
theoretical thinking inexorably leads to presentism in the justification of 
interpretations. In other words, social and political conditions in the present 
come to play a significant role. Although dominant ideals of “objective” 
historying upheld for so long the view that bringing present-day demands 
and the situation of the author into talk about the past should be eradicated, 
such a requirement is of course impossible (as earlier forms of constructivism 
have similarly already reminded, of course). Historical studies necessarily 
involve representation and representation cannot be context-independent in 
this (or indeed in any) way. What is more, hiding behind illusions of objectivity 
and the empirical, as well as concealing one’s subjectivity, is irresponsible on 
the part of the historian: for those historians who suggest that they are only 
reporting “things as they were” or permitting the past to “speak”, this attitude 
merely provides a convenient excuse for not considering the consequences 
of their actions. And this, in itself, is sufficient to strengthen already existing 
prejudices. As White nicely expresses it: “Nothing is better suited to lead 
to a repetition of the past than a study of it that is either reverential or 
convincingly objective in the way that conventional historical studies tend to 
be” (WHITE 1987, p. 82).
If our views of the past were taken as being similarly entailed by facts, 
and in that sense free of interpretation, those views (or more emphatically: our 
historical consciousness) would be purely conformist.
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The pragmatic or presentist nature of historical consciousness, as well 
as of views about the past is, however, fairly self-evident and ineradicable. 
For this reason, the narrative constructivist challenge that has loomed over 
conventional history writing for so many decades does not constitute nearly as 
great a problem with respect to practical views about the past. Or is it possible to 
think about our views of the past as somehow detached from their significance 
– that is, from their function in identity formation and in the explanation and 
negotiation of existing states of affairs? As Jörn Rüsen (2005, p. 24) has noted: 
“Historical consciousness serves as a key orientational element [...]. Historical 
consciousness evokes the past as a mirror of experience within which life in the 
present is reflected”.
According to a presentist way of thinking, the past has presence in our 
daily lives (albeit this should be qualified in many ways) and we may learn 
something from it, or at least construct something useful with reference to 
it. Yet, this does not amount to making the old claim that history can teach 
us lessons. Furthermore, it should be noted that in this kind of use of the 
past, historical studies are turned to largely in order to obtain bits of factual 
information as well as, perhaps, to find models and ways of thinking (stories, 
beliefs, values, ideologies, and so on) that are suited to our own very specific 
presentist needs.
During recent years, the idea of the presence of history and/or the past 
has resurfaced in history theoretical debates with great vigor. In contrast to the 
earlier discussion about memory, experiencing the past in some way directly and 
on a subjective level has now been one important object of enthusiasm.8 This 
latest interest may in part be a consequence of the fact that historical research 
no longer promises the same epistemological certainty and hence the resulting 
insecurities need to be addressed in new ways. A rather surprising champion of 
the idea of experience in the current debate has been Frank Ankersmit, especially 
with his Sublime Historical Experience (2005). The surprise here stems largely 
from the contradiction this advocacy of experience seems to establish with 
Ankersmit’s previous narrative constructivist approach.9 Focus on the narrative 
or constructed dimension of history writing has now been displaced by the idea 
of a past that can be available and “present” without representation (see in 
particular ICKE 2011).10
As far as I can see, this line of thinking is motivated by a strong desire to 
demonstrate that the past has significance in the present, in other words, to 
show that the past and knowledge about it have a practical function.
8 For a summary of the memory debate in the 1980s and 1990s, see e.g. KLEIN 2000.
9 For a concise presentation of his earlier position, see e.g. ANKERSMIT 1990.
10 As Ankersmit notes (2005, 5), the reception of his arguments depends on what we make of the idea of 
“collective memory”. As long as we discuss experience and the presence of the past on the level of memory 
and the individual, his claims are quite unproblematic. Things change, however, when this same terminology 
is taken up as a collective “remembering” and turned into the assertion that the historian can experience 
his or her community’s past - a past beyond and outside of personal experiences - somehow “directly” (cf. 
ANKERSMIT 2005, 317 ff., esp. 337). Ankersmit makes comprehension of his position even more difficult by 
not making a clearer distinction between experience and the kinds of affects and heightened experientiality 
presented in his examples (most often, importantly, as a result of encounters with artworks).
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Particularly interesting about this discussion of presence is the way in which 
the concepts of memory (both individual memory and “collective memory” or 
remembrance on a social level) and history seem to have become confused (more 
on this in ICKE 2011). In this respect, the current debate goes much further 
than the previous one, which mostly centered on ideas of commemorating and 
respecting the past. In the debate of the 1980s and 1990s, one interesting 
question was that of knowing and truth on the level of historical consciousness; 
monuments, for instance, were hoped to remind of the uniqueness of things 
and events in the past by striving for representation and metaphors that would 
prevent simplistic appropriations and closures regarding their objects (see 
e.g. YOUNG 2000). It was, in effect then, the same goal as that set by White 
when he argues for renewed forms of presentation in history writing. Ideally, 
written and cinematic representations, for example, could be held to lead to 
enhanced emotional effects and experientiality. In my reading, the goal (albeit 
still most often unarticulated, it seems to me) of the recent debate on presence 
has also been to bring experientiality to center stage. Yet, despite what I take 
to be at least a partially common goal, it is hard to understand suggestions 
that representation might somehow be bypassed and the past could produce 
experience “in itself” or be encountered “directly”.
Even though the mystical emphasis of presence is also, in a sense, an 
argument about historical consciousness, it seems irrelevant to discussions 
about history and representing the past. This kind of presence – ultimately 
subjectively constructed and imagined – cannot help reintroduce epistemological 
or material foundations to contemporary debates.11
The experientiality of the past
The experientiality of historical writing has come to constitute an intriguing 
and often central issue in historical studies over the recent decades. It is also 
important for debates involving public history, the use and popularization of 
history, as well as historical consciousness. As already described, the question of 
experientiality has become more pressing following the loss of authority suffered 
by historical studies by a broader recognition of the epistemological problematics 
involved. Because history can no longer achieve sufficient credibility by appealing 
to the truth, it needs to be able to convince readers of the interpretations it 
provides by means of a strong experientiality or even simulated experiences. 
And, because history still predominantly exists in historical writing (or in 
representation by some other largely mimetic and most often narrative means), 
such experientiality is constructed primarily by means of form and associated 
aesthetic impact.
Broader historical consciousness is undoubtedly informed by these kinds 
of representational experiences as created by aesthetic means (heightened 
experientiality), but a major component is also the already discussed, faux 
11 For more on the tug of war between these perspectives, see e.g. RUNIA 2010; JENKINS 2010; and 
ICKE 2011.
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“experience” of the past: in encounters made possible by festivals, exhibits, 
museums, heritage sites and even memorials, for instance, viewers or 
participants may be significantly affected by the presence of preserved artifacts 
or by reconstructed conditions (they can be equally affected, of course, in more 
commonplace, everyday situations). At various kinds of heritage centers or 
history villages, events and reenactments, participants may also achieve much 
stronger experiences by an active engagement than they would as merely 
passive spectators (see e.g. AGNEW 2004; 2007).
Yet, it would be wrong to claim that such “experience” – seemingly 
encountering the past in these imaginary and completely mediated and 
constructed ways – could constitute some real or actual access to the past. On 
the other hand, these experienced encounters cannot be neatly returned to 
questions about history in the institutional sense or to knowledge about the past 
either. Importantly, then, while at stake is a parallel phenomenon to history, the 
concepts we use for tackling it should be distinguished from those we employ 
when dealing with historical studies. Having said that, there is some crucial 
common ground too. Historical studies and popular representations do share 
the same “imaginary” logic: beyond the factual or material dimension, they are 
both simply about interpretation, the employment of the imagination, illusion 
and fantasy.
But experientiality is a far more acceptable goal for popular representations 
that produce and reproduce views about the past than it is for historical 
studies. This follows primarily from the simple fact that the history institution 
and its efforts to maintain a position of authority cause the difficulties in the 
first place. Because truth is so central to history’s existence – at least in the 
current institutional manifestation –, it needs to defend its territory. But history 
has no comparable authority over popular interpretations – even if, it must be 
noted, historians do sometimes view the presentation of incorrect details and 
interpretations in films as something that requires their attention. This attitude 
might be justified if the function of these representations were still thought 
to follow from their contents. If, however, it is assumed that their function is 
not determined quite so straightforwardly (as would seem to be the case in 
light of present-day understandings), a greater role needs to be ascribed to 
the intentions behind and possible consequences of the representation. And if 
intentions and consequences are emphasized, both the truthful representation of 
individual facts and fidelity toward broader interpretations offered by historical 
studies become less important. A film may well incorporate invented materials 
(individual details are often not decisive for the meaning or “message” of a 
representation) or factual “mistakes” (after all, gaps in the existing data need 
to be supplemented just as they are in historical writing), and the interpretation 
it offers can be incompatible with those offered by historical studies (otherwise 
we could never have anything but conformist readings). 
The genre commitments of film (as indeed the commitments of other forms 
of performance and art) require, rather, that it offer viewers something new and 
experiential, something that resonates with their reality (for more on this, see 
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e.g. WHITE 1999; PIHLAINEN 2008; 2009; MUNSLOW; ROSENSTONE 2004; 
MUNSLOW 2010, esp. 182 ff.). This popular knowledge or general understanding 
of the past is not comparable to the knowledge produced by historical studies. 
Discussions focusing on the commensurability of these forms of knowledge are 
not meaningful, then, because the intentions of the practices in question are so 
far removed from each other.
Although the specific issues of the experientiality of historical writing and its 
reach and impact need to be further investigated, it is clear that popular forms 
of “history” are involved in the shaping of a broader historical consciousness 
and, even more visibly, in the entertainment of history consumers. Presentism 
and experientiality offer an opportunity to reach the audience more effectively, 
and factual considerations are set aside to achieve this.
Conclusion: Historical consciousness as a practical tool
In speaking of historical consciousness, it is important to understand the 
limited role of institutional historiography. This understanding requires some 
investigation into the nature of historical studies, as well as an acceptance of 
the constructed aspects of history. What should be realized, to put it succinctly, 
is that even though historical research can attain factual information about the 
past – and these facts can be effectively used in questioning narratives –, no 
necessity or entailment can be shown between that information or those facts 
and the story or meaning imposed on them.
The idea that facts do not entail a particular interpretation or narrative 
does not, however, imply the kind of extreme relativism that historians so often 
appear to expect and fear from constructivist theorizing. Facts will unavoidably 
play a role in the construction of historical narratives as long as the generic 
commitments of history require the use of the available information about the 
past. The significance of constructivism is in the idea that narratives do not exist 
in the past – and nor can they be found or discovered in factual information or 
with recourse to it. Put bluntly: if something does not exist, it cannot be found 
but must instead be invented (WHITE 1978, p. 82).
Similarly, and as long as we are talking about a specifically historical 
consciousness, it seems unreasonable to overlook the role of the institution 
completely. Historical studies have a part to play in shaping historical 
consciousness – especially as long as the attitudes and values it produces are 
systematically promoted in schools and by the media. Because institutional 
commitments largely continue to define contemporary forms of historical 
writing and representation on the basis knowledge – and there is no direct or 
unmediated way in which knowledge can be carried over into representations –, 
the institutional desire of history to act as guardian of the past is unreasonable. 
If the institution of history were to better recognize the role of interpretation 
and presentist intentions, its relation to historical consciousness would perhaps 
become less complicated too.
Likewise, arguments concerning the presence of the past are often 
overstated. The past cannot (already by definition) be present except by some 
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means of representation: in this respect, constructivism appears extremely 
difficult to deny. Consequently all naïve, romantic or nostalgic thoughts about 
a “directly” or “innocently” available past and the lessons it can teach us in the 
present are equally problematic.
With respect to historical consciousness, the important issue is the function 
and purpose of the meanings that we attach to the past when speaking about it.
While such presentism has proven problematic in debates about historical 
studies, it does not seem to be nearly as controversial with regard to general 
thinking about the past or with respect to historical consciousness. Not 
surprisingly, contemporary consumers of the past are far more pragmatic in 
their daily lives than many professional historians are in their work. Indeed, it 
seems that the freedom afforded by popular historical consciousness for coping 
with uncertainty and making pragmatic interpretations in daily lives is only 
compromised by official history education and the popularization of the results 
of historical studies – at least as long as these latter forces choose to uphold 
the illusion of an epistemically sound and non-problematic relation between 
historical sources and interpretation.
Bibliographical references
AGNEW, Vanessa. Introduction: What is reenactment?. Criticism, v. 46, n. 3 p. 
327-339, 2004.
______. History’s affective turn: historical reenactment and its work in the 
present. Rethinking History, v. 11, n. 3, p. 299-312, 2007.
ANKERSMIT, F. R. [Historiography and postmodernism: reconsiderations]: Reply 
to professor Zagorin. History and Theory, v. 29, n. 3, p. 275-296, 1990.
______. Sublime historical experience. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005.
ASSMANN, Jan. Religion and cultural memory: ten studies. Transl. Rodney 
Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
CLASSEN, Christoph; KANSTEINER, Wulf. Truth and authenticity in contemporary 
historical culture: an introduction to Historical representation and historical 
truth. History and Theory, v. 48, n. 2, p. 1-4, 2009.
COHEN, Sande. Disparity, information, and consumption: hello to an agonistics 
of the future. In: COHEN, Sande; RUTSKY, R. L. (eds.). Consumption 
in an age of information. Oxford; New York: Berg Publishers, 2005, p. 
155-180.
DAVIES, Martin. Historics: why history dominates contemporary society. 
London; New York: Routledge, 2006.
HUGHES-WARRINGTON, Marnie. History goes to the movies: studying history 
on film. London; New York: Routledge, 2007.
HUYSSEN, Andreas. Present pasts: urban palimpsests and the politics of 
25
On historical consciousness and popular pasts_________________________________________________________________________________
hist. historiogr. • ouro preto • n. 15 • agosto • 2014 • p. 10-26 • doi: 10.15848/hh.v0i15.685
memory. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
ICKE, Peter P. Frank Ankersmit’s lost “historical” cause: a journey from 
language to experience. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
IGGERS, Georg G. Historiography between scholarship and poetry: reflections 
on Hayden White’s approach to historiography. Rethinking History, v. 
4, n. 3, p. 373-390, 2000.
JENKINS, Keith. Why history? Ethics and postmodernity. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1999.
______. Inventing the new from the old: from White’s “tropics” to Vico’s “topics” 
(Referee’s report). Rethinking History, v. 14, n. 2, p. 243-248, 2010.
KALELA, Jorma. Historiantutkimus ja historia [Historical research and 
history]. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2000.
KLEIN, Kerwin Lee. On the emergence of memory in historical discourse. 
Representations, v. 69, n. 1, p. 127-150, 2000.
LUKACS, John. Historical consciousness: the remembered past. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
MUNSLOW, Alun. The future of history. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010.
______; ROSENSTONE, Robert A. (eds.). Experiments in rethinking history. 
London; New York: Routledge, 2004.
OAKESHOTT, Michael. Experience and its modes. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985 [1933].
PAUL, Herman. An ironic battle against irony: epistemological and ideological 
irony in Hayden White’s philosophy of history, 1955–1973. In: KORHONEN, 
Kuisma (ed.). Tropes for the past: Hayden White and the history/
literature debate. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006, p. 35-44.
PIHLAINEN, Kalle. Of closure and convention: surpassing representation through 
performance and the referential. Rethinking History, v. 6, n. 2, p. 179-
200, 2002.
______. History in the world: Hayden White and the consumer of history. 
Rethinking History, v. 12, n. 1, p. 23-39, 2008.
______. On history as communication and constraint. Ideas in History, v. 4, 
n. 2, p. 63-90, 2009.
RUNIA, Eelco. Inventing the new from the old: from White’s “tropics” to Vico’s 
“topics”. Rethinking History, v. 14, n. 2, p. 229-241, 2010.
RÜSEN, Jörn. History: narration, interpretation, orientation. New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2005.
WHITE, Hayden. Metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth-century 
Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
26
hist. historiogr. • ouro preto • n. 15 • agosto • 2014 • p. 10-26 • doi: 10.15848/hh.v0i15.685
_________________________________________________________________________________Kalle Pihlainen
______. Tropics of discourse: essays in cultural criticism. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978.
______. The content of the form: narrative discourse and historical 
representation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
______.  Figural realism: studies in the mimesis effect. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999.
______. Politics, history, and the practical past. Storia della Storiografia, v. 
61, p. 127-134, 2012.
YOUNG, James E. At memory’s edge: after-images of the Holocaust in 
contemporary art and architecture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000.
ZAGORIN, Perez. History, the referent, and narrative: reflections on 
postmodernism now. History and Theory, v. 38, n. 1, p. 1-24, 1999.
